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I. INTRODUCTION 
The historical relationship between juveniles and the judicial sys-
tem is complex and multi-faceted. Addressing juvenile criminal offend-
ers involves historical trends, social attitudes, biological developments, 
Constitutional considerations, and punishment principles. Through the 
discourse, a question remains as to juvenile offenders and how they dif-
fer from adult offenders. If a difference exists in the cause of crime, the 
influence upon action, the understanding of judicial procedure, or the 
ability for future improvement, then one could argue that differences 
must also exist in the trial and treatment of juvenile offenders. The 
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most difficult component is analyzing the differences and then overlay-
ing a legislative procedure that accounts for justice in this regard.  
This article evaluates the past and present factors for juveniles in 
the judicial system, and then considers the current Idaho legislation 
that mandates the transfer of juveniles into adult criminal court when 
they are accused of certain, enumerated crimes. Part II examines the 
history of juvenile courts and the transfer of offenders out of those 
courts. It also highlights the Supreme Court rulings for youth, the ra-
tionale and social influence in national trends, and the stance of Idaho 
legislation on the topic. Part III argues that Idaho’s mandatory juvenile 
transfer laws are bad policy because they contradict the rationale of the 
Supreme Court and ignore recent and overwhelming scientific data on 
neurobiological development. This article concludes with the recommen-
dation to eliminate the automatic transfer laws and instead impose par-
ticularized rules for procedure in which the accused juvenile is granted 
counsel, an ability to answer allegations, and an individualized process.  
II. HISTORY OF JUVENILE COURTS  
A. Origins of Juvenile Courts 
A nineteenth century shift in philosophy laid the foundation for the 
American juvenile court system.1 As the nation limited the scope of cap-
ital punishment, it also reconsidered whether it should treat juveniles 
as adults.2 One of the first representations of this reconsideration of ju-
venile treatment occurred in 1824 in New York, where legislation au-
thorized the court to move criminals into the House of Refuge if they 
were under the age of 16.3 The House of Refuge was an establishment 
that provided structured rehabilitation for juveniles and thus an alter-
native to the punishment of incarceration.4 In addition to juveniles who 
had committed crimes, the House of Refuge also accepted poor and un-
fortunate youth, and provided all with education and community 
through a regimented schedule.5 As a foundation and justification for its 
practice, the House of Refuge and similar programs referenced parens 
patriae, a philosophy with origins in the English common law.6 Parens 
patriae literally means “parent of his or her country” and generally re-
fers to the capacity of the state to provide protection for individuals un-
                                                       
 1. Sanford J. Fox, Juvenile Justice Reform: An Historical Perspective, 22 STAN. L. 
REV. 1187, 1202 (1970). 
 2. Lucia B. Whisenand & Edward J. McLaughlin, Completing the Cycle: Reality 
and the Juvenile Justice System in New York State, 47 ALB. L. REV. 1, 12 (1982). 
 3. Id. (citing Act of Mar. 29, 1824, ch. 126, [1824] N.Y. Laws 110). See also, B. K. 
PEIRCE, A HALF CENTURY WITH JUVENILE DELINQUENTS; OR THE NEW YORK HOUSE OF 
REFUGE AND ITS TIMES 34 (1869). 
 4. Fox, supra note 1, at 1205.  
 5. Clifford E. Simonsen, Juvenile Justice in America 301 (3d ed. 1991). 
 6. See generally Lawrence B. Custer, The Origins of the Doctrine of Parens Patri-
ae, 27 EMORY L. J. 195 (1978).  
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able to care for themselves.7 With beginnings in the feudal system, the 
doctrine frequently arose to justify the King’s powers as a guardian, or 
his ‘royal prerogative.’8 For example, when a legally insane individual 
owned land, parens patriae allowed the King to retain control of the 
property to ensure security during the lunatic’s life and proper transfer 
upon death.9  
Similar to the King providing protection for the insane, American 
courts imposed a structure and rehabilitative perspective upon juveniles 
through institutions like the House of Refuge. The states were therefore 
undertaking a parental role for the protection of these delinquent youth. 
However, as the circumstances changed, so too did the methods to pro-
vide this protection.10 Originally meant for minor juvenile offenders, the 
House of Refuge and other similar establishments began accepting more 
serious offenders over time.11 With this changing dynamic, the institu-
tions began a procedure of sending minors to work on rural farms or 
other labor-intensive environments until they turned 21.12 Reformers 
were critical of this methodology and states sought a more effective 
method of providing rehabilitation for juvenile offenders without resort-
ing to incarceration.13 
Since the principle of parens patriae came to the United States as a 
variation of the English application, it existed as a unique right and de-
cision of each state. After failed institutional procedures, American 
courts became involved in the juvenile protection scheme through legis-
lative action.14 In 1899, Illinois became the first state to establish a ju-
venile court.15 This first court, founded in Cook County, was a result of 
Illinois legislation that permitted circuit court judges to hear cases in-
volving “dependent, neglected, and delinquent” children under the age of 
16.16 The cases were heard in a specially designated courtroom called 
“Juvenile Court.”17 Additionally, these cases involved delinquent, de-
                                                       
 7. Parens patriae, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009). 
 8. See Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co. of Cal., 405 U.S. 251, 257 (1972). 
 9. Custer, supra note 6, at 196.  
 10. See Thomas J. Bernard & Megan Clouser Kurlychek, The Cycle of Juvenile Jus-
tice 65 (2d ed. 1992).  
 11. Fox, supra note 1, at 1213.  
 12. Barry Krisberg, The Juvenile Court: Reclaiming the Vision 3 (1988). 
 13. See BERNARD, supra note 10, at 66. 
 14. See Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico, ex rel., Barez, 458 U.S. 592, 600 
(1982).  
 15. See Barry Krisbero & James F. Austin, Reinventing Juvenile Justice 30 (1993). 
 16. Juvenile Court Act of 1899, 1899 Ill. Laws 131. 
 17. Id. at § 3.  
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pendent, and neglected children.18 Unlike the punitive philosophy of 
criminal courts at the time, this Illinois juvenile court sought to investi-
gate, diagnose, and treat the problems, instead of assigning guilt or 
blame.19 Thus, the doctrine of parens patriae arose again – this time as 
a rationale for juvenile court and state intervention in cases of deviant 
children in the court process.20  
Although Illinois was the first state to enact a juvenile court, it was 
by no means the last.21 Within twenty-five years, every state besides 
Maine and Wyoming had created juvenile court systems comparable to 
the one in Illinois.22 Such widespread acceptance of juvenile court re-
form can be attributed to several factors, such as the expansion of social 
work, an emergence of child psychology, and the child welfare move-
ment, which included child labor laws and mandatory school provi-
sions.23 In combination, the influential factors resulted in the ac-
ceptance of the juvenile court in an overwhelming number of states by 
1925.24 
B. Evolution of Juvenile Courts 
Throughout the inception of the juvenile court system, legislatures 
have retained the presumption that children are inherently good and 
thus separate from the rules of criminal procedure.25 This presumption 
finds its general roots in the philosophy of parens patriae, which pro-
claims “the child who has begun to go wrong . . . is to be taken in hand 
by the state . . . as the ultimate guardian, because either the unwilling-
ness or inability of the natural parents to guide it toward good citizen-
ship has compelled the intervention.”26 More specifically, however, the 
supposition of goodness and morality pervades the doctrine of rehabili-
tation. Broadly speaking, to rehabilitate is to treat a disease, requiring 
an individual diagnosis with the intent to return back to health.27 
Therefore, a child cannot be considered inherently evil in order for this 
rehabilitative juvenile court system to thrive. Simply put, “the rehabili-
tative purposes of the juvenile court system can be fulfilled only if the 
scope of the regime is limited to those offenders who are capable of re-
                                                       
 18. Michele Benedetto Neitz, A Unique Bench, A Common Code: Evaluating Judi-
cial Ethics in Juvenile Court, 24 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 97, 101 (2011).  
 19. See Simonsen, supra note 5, at 228.  
 20. See Fox, supra note 1, at 1193. 
 21. See generally, Barry C. Feld, The Transformation of the Juvenile Court, 75 
MINN. L. REV. 691 (1991).  
 22. See Paul W. Tappan, Juvenile Delinquency 172 (1949). 
 23. See Merril Sobie, Pity the Child: The Age of Delinquency in New York, 30 PACE 
L. REV. 1061, 1064 (2010); Fox, supra note 1, at 1230.  
 24. Tappan, supra note 22, at 172. 
 25. Julian W. Mack, The Juvenile Court, 23 HARV. L. REV. 104, 120 (1909). 
 26. Id. at 107. 
 27. See Barry C. Feld, The Juvenile Court Meets the Principle of the Offense: Legis-
lative Changes in Juvenile Waiver Statutes, 78 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 471, 475 (1987).  
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habilitation.”28 As a result, the idea of crime and punishment for juve-
niles remained outside the early twentieth century discourse, which in-
stead focused primarily on treatment and rehabilitation.29 The goal of 
rehabilitation therefore controlled the entire juvenile process by the 
time this new court system had spread throughout the country.30  
Since the goals of the juvenile system focused so significantly on 
the treatment of the youth, reformers and critics constantly analyzed 
the effects of the courts.31 Similar to the reform movement prior to ju-
venile courts, changing circumstances and undesirable realities encour-
aged a further evolution in the juvenile system through the middle of 
the twentieth century. One influential factor was state governments and 
their increasing control over organizations.32 After earlier failures of the 
eighteenth century rehabilitation institutions, states became more in-
volved in moving criminal children into private schools and organiza-
tions.33 This transition rendered aspects of the juvenile court system 
irrelevant, insofar as the state was able to directly provide rehabilita-
tion services.34 Additionally, industrialization and urbanization limited 
the role of the juvenile court to place delinquent children in family or 
foster homes.35 Even more, the negative realities of some juvenile hous-
ing complexes again encouraged a change in the court system. Critics 
discovered that some housing facilities had become less of a home for 
juveniles and more of a cellblock, with guards and isolation rooms.36 
From all these factors, criticism mounted against the initial juvenile 
justice system, which had often limited constitutional rights in favor of a 
state-controlled rehabilitation.37  
In addition to the circumstantial and sociological changes that pro-
duced criticism of the juvenile court system, many critics also struck at 
the heart of the system – the rehabilitation doctrine. One emerging 
school of thought challenged the perception that children were inherent-
ly good.38 Similarly, the idea that someone could eliminate or cure youth 
                                                       
 28. Directors of The Columbia Law Review Association, Inc., Rights and Rehabilita-
tion in the Juvenile Courts, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 281, 283 (1967) [hereinafter Rights and Reha-
bilitation].  
 29. See Mack, supra note 25, at 107; Application of Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 15–16 (1967). 
 30. Rights and Rehabilitation, supra note 28, at 282.  
 31. See generally Helen Leland Witmer & Edith Tufts, The Effectiveness of Delin-
quency Prevention Programs (1954). 
 32. Id. at 34–36. 
 33. Id. at 35–36. 
 34. Id. at 36.  
 35. Fox, supra note 1, at 1231. 
 36. Albert Deutsch, Our Rejected Children 15 (1950). 
 37. See, e.g., Witmer & Tufts, supra note 31, at 3.  
 38. Fox, supra note 1, at 1233. 
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delinquency was diminishing.39 The population of juveniles was increas-
ing.40 Juvenile crime was reaching an exceptionally high level.41 And 
scholarly investigation into the situation revealed that procedural inad-
equacies perpetuated the problem.42 The practical pressures of the court 
system and the statistics to encourage change resulted in another wave 
of reconsideration about the juvenile court system. 
C. Supreme Court Rulings 
As a consequence of the changing mid-twentieth century percep-
tions, juvenile courts incorporated more formal procedures. Although 
many issues existed, the judiciary narrowed its focus to the rights of ju-
veniles and protective judicial procedures. Since parens patriae claimed 
to provide such individualized and distinct treatment for the youth, it 
also consistently deprived the equivalent of due process protections in 
the Constitution.43 The underlying rationale for early due process depri-
vation was that these rights “would only hinder the court in its benevo-
lent relationship to the child and hinder the child in accepting the 
treatment to be provided.”44 Procedural safeguards and constitutional 
guarantees were therefore considered unnecessary before the judicial 
revolution of the mid-twentieth century.45 Afterwards, juveniles received 
many Constitutional rights that they previously had not been afforded, 
particularly with respect to the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.  
i. The Early Supreme Court Ruling  
The first significant Supreme Court case involving a juvenile was 
Haley v. Ohio.46 Although this case occurred twenty years before the 
influential 1960s, it marked a transition in the way the Supreme Court 
addressed the Constitutional rights of a juvenile. In 1948, a 15-year-old 
African-American was arrested as a suspect in a convenience store rob-
bery and shooting.47 Although parties generally disagreed about the 
facts, undisputed testimony revealed that the juvenile was arrested 
around midnight, questioned without counsel for five hours, shown al-
leged confessions from two other youth, and then coerced into a confes-
                                                       
 39. Fox, supra note 1, at 1233. 
 40. See Laura B. Shrestha & Elayne J. Heisler, The Changing Demographic Profile 
of the United States, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE 15 (Mar. 31, 2011), 
https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL32701.pdf.  
 41. Bernard, supra note 10, at 4.  
 42. Fox, supra note 1, at 1233. 
 43. Thomas Grisso, Juveniles' Waiver of Rights: Legal and Psychological Compe-
tence 3 (Bruce Dennis Sales, 1981). 
 44. Id. at 4. 
 45. Id. 
 46. 332 U.S. 596 (1948).  
 47. Id. at 597. 
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sion.48 Once in jail, and after his mother retained a lawyer, the accused 
juvenile was still not allowed any visits by counsel, family, or friends 
until he was formally charged three days later.49  
The Supreme Court ruled that the Due Process Clause barred the 
use of a confession taken illegally from the adolescent.50 Specifically, the 
Court stated, “Neither man nor child can be allowed to stand condemned 
by methods which flout constitutional requirements of due process of 
law.”51 This ruling in Haley v. Ohio is significant because it proclaims 
the right of all American citizens—youth and adult—to due process and 
fairness.52 Significantly, this judicial application to both juvenile and 
adult criminals appears to contradict the original purpose of juvenile 
rights. Recall, the initial reform movement sought to treat young crimi-
nals differently than adults, and consequently, the entire process afford-
ed different rules and results for a young offender.53 Importantly, the 
Supreme Court in its 1948 decision recognized that such stubborn in-
sistence on different treatment can actually restrict Constitutional 
rights.54 In other words, blindly using a principle that sought to protect 
juveniles had resulted in a deprivation that harms these defendants in 
Court.  
Furthermore, the Court in Haley demonstrated a flexible and bene-
ficial position. On one hand, the Court ruled that “the Fourteenth 
Amendment prohibits the police from using the private, secret custody 
of either man or child as a device for wringing confessions from them.”55 
On the other hand, the Court explicitly considered the accused’s age, 
experience, and maturity when it analyzed the actions of the police of-
ficers.56 Although twenty years before the wave of Supreme Court cases, 
the bench offered a glimpse into future juvenile rights and representa-
tion. 
ii. Mid-Century Landmark Decisions 
At the end of the 1960s, the Supreme Court addressed juvenile 
rights with several landmark cases. Changing social and political land-
                                                       
 48. Id. at 597–98. 
 49. Id. at 598–99.  
 50. Id. at 599–600. 
 51. Id. at 601.  
 52. Haley, 332 U.S. at 596; See also Sally T. Green, Prosecutorial Waiver into Adult 
Criminal Court: A Conflict of Interests Violation Amounting to the States’ Legislative Abro-
gation of Juveniles’ Due Process Rights, 110 PENN ST. L. REV. 233, 263–64 (2005).  
 53. See supra Part II.B. 
 54. Haley, 332 U.S. at 596. 
 55. Id. at 601.  
 56. Id. at 599–601.  
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scapes, as well as the aforementioned inadequacies and faults in the 
current juvenile system, resulted in a group of Supreme Court cases 
that incorporated a new interpretation and philosophy regarding chil-
dren in court. The consequence was a fundamental change in how the 
judicial system treats juveniles accused of a crime.57  
In many ways, this striking change reflected the Supreme Court 
decision in Haley v. Ohio, therein providing the same Constitutional 
rights to juveniles as the Court has afforded adults. However, equal 
treatment supplies not only equal Constitutional rights, but also equal 
judicial process and punishment. Thus, while juveniles gained Constitu-
tional protections, they also became subject to the punitive sentencing 
that original juvenile reform sought to avoid.  
The year 1966 marked the first time the United States Supreme 
Court specifically reviewed a state’s statutory juvenile transfer laws.58 
In the case of Kent v. United States, a 14-year-old boy named Morris 
Kent was arrested for his involvement in several crimes, including 
breaking into homes and attempted theft. Two years later, an intruder 
entered a woman’s apartment and proceeded to rape her and steal her 
wallet.59 The fingerprints at the scene matched up with Kent, who was 
on probation at the time.60 Police arrested Kent and brought him to the 
station for seven hours of interrogation, at which point he confessed to 
the crimes.61 Without arraignment or other probable cause, the police 
held Kent in custody for a week and subjected him to juvenile court ju-
risdiction, according to the District of Columbia Juvenile Code Act.62 
Under this code, the juvenile court judge has the authority to waive ju-
risdiction of a youth if he is 16 years or older and is charged with a felo-
ny.63 Despite the mandate to investigate and hold a hearing, the juvenile 
court judge ignored Kent’s motion for a hearing and transferred him 
into adult criminal court.64  
The Supreme Court considered the process of this D.C. juvenile 
court and its implications on the accused’s Constitutional rights.65 The 
Court held that the D.C. Juvenile Code Act required a full investigation 
before a waiver, and thus the juvenile court must conduct a hearing.66 
At this hearing, the accused must be given counsel, who has access to all 
applicable reports and records.67 In its analysis, the Supreme Court fo-
cused on the Constitutional due process rights of the parties in juvenile 
                                                       
 57. See Robert C. Trojanowicz & Merry Morash, Juvenile Delinquency: Concepts 
and Control 140 (3d ed. 1983). 
 58. Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541 (1966).  
 59. Id. at 543.  
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. at 544.  
 62. Id. at 544–45. 
 63. Id. at 547–48. 
 64. Kent, 383 U.S. at 548. 
 65. Id. at 551–64. 
 66. Id. at 561. 
 67. Id. at 561–62. 
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court. Any state’s juvenile legislation, particularly with regards to the 
judge’s discretion to waive hearings, must “satisfy the basic require-
ments of due process and fairness.”68 The Court emphasized the follow-
ing in its holding: 
[T]here is no place in our system of law for reaching such tre-
mendous consequences without ceremony–without hearing, 
without effective assistance of counsel, without a statement of 
reasons. It is inconceivable that a court of justice dealing with 
adults . . . would proceed in this manner. It would be extraordi-
nary if society's special concern over children, as reflected in the 
District of Columbia's Juvenile Court Act, permitted this proce-
dure. We hold that it does not.69  
 In my opinion, the Court's poignant language supports extending 
the same due process protections that are enjoyed by adults to juveniles.  
Therefore, any state laws that allow transfer of juveniles to criminal 
court must satisfy fairness and the Constitutional rights afforded to all 
citizens. One particular method to satisfy this fairness and process is to 
consider the minor offender through eight particular factors.70 The fac-
tors in Kent directed the analysis of the juvenile and imposed a frame-
work through which the transfer procedure must pass.71 The Court still 
explicitly gave deference and discretion to the juvenile courts, but did 
not authorize complete control, especially of the juvenile’s Constitution-
al rights.72  
In 1967, the Supreme Court addressed the Constitutional rights af-
forded to juveniles in the case In re Gault.73 There, the Supreme Court 
ruled on the rights of a fifteen-year-old boy who was arrested for making 
lewd remarks to a neighbor.74 At the time of arrest, Gerald Gault was 
                                                       
 68. Id. at 553.  
 69. Id. at 554. 
 70. The determinative factors are: (1) the seriousness of the offense to the commu-
nity and whether protection of the community requires waiver; (2) whether the alleged of-
fense was committed in an aggressive, violent, premeditated, or willful manner; (3) whether 
the alleged offense was against persons or property; (4) the prosecutive merit of the com-
plaint; (5) the desirability of the trial and dispositions of the entire offense in one court when 
the juveniles associates in the alleged offense are adults; (6) the sophistication and maturity 
of the juvenile as determined by consideration of his home, environmental situation, emo-
tional attitude and pattern of living; (7) the record and previous contacts of the juvenile with 
the court; (8) the prospects of adequate protection of the public and the likelihood of rehabili-
tation of the juvenile. Kent, 383 U.S. at 566–67. 
 71. Id. at 566–568. 
 72. Id. at 557. 
 73. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967).  
 74. Id. at 4. 
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still subject to six months’ probation.75 Police never informed his par-
ents of the arrest and did not properly serve a petition.76 The first hear-
ing had no transcript or complaint presented, and at the second hearing, 
Gault was sentenced to the State Industrial School.77 To make matters 
worse, under the Arizona juvenile system, this convicted minor was not 
entitled to an appeal.78  
At the Supreme Court, the issue was whether Gault received suffi-
cient due process when he was adjudicated as a delinquent and sen-
tenced to a state institution.79 On this point, the Court noted the goal of 
the juvenile system is to protect the children.80 But in this instance, the 
juvenile system had in effect restrained the juvenile’s liberty by placing 
him in an industrial school. Because of this, “it would be extraordinary 
if our Constitution did not require the procedural regularity and the ex-
ercise of care implied in the phrase ‘due process.’”81 The Supreme Court, 
therefore, held that notice of the charge must be given to the child’s par-
ents before the hearing and within sufficient time.82 
Three years after its ruling in Gault, the Supreme Court instilled 
an even higher burden of proof in juvenile cases. In re Winship involved 
a twelve-year-old boy who stole $112 from a woman’s purse.83 The origi-
nal adjudication occurred in the New York Family Court, where a judge 
relied on New York processes instead of the Fourteenth Amendment to 
the U.S. Constitution.84 Accordingly, the hearing judge utilized the 
“preponderance of the evidence” standard and ordered the child to 
eighteen months in a training school, subject to extensions until he 
turned eighteen years old.85  
Upon review, the Supreme Court took issue with this distinct evi-
dentiary standard, stating, “The same considerations that demand ex-
treme caution in factfinding to protect the innocent adult apply as wel to 
the innocent child.”86 According to the Court, individuals of all ages de-
serve the same Constitutional protections against accusations.87 Since 
the Due Process Clause of the Constitution protects the accused to proof 
beyond a reasonable doubt when they are charged with violation of a 
criminal law, this standard applies to juveniles.88 Thus, the Court ex-
                                                       
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. at 5.  
 77. Id. at 7. 
 78. Id. at 8. 
 79. Gault, 387 U.S. at 13.  
 80. See id. at 14–16; see generally Stephen A. Newman, Forward: The Past, Pre-
sent, and Future of Juvenile Justice Reform in New York State, 56 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 1263 
(2011).  
 81. Gault, 387 U.S. at 27–28. 
 82. Id. at 31–34.  
 83. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 360 (1970). 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id.  
 86. Id. at 365.  
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. 
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panded upon the ruling in Gault and held that “the constitutional safe-
guard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt is as much required during the 
adjudicatory stage of a delinquency proceeding as are . . . notice of 
charges, right to counsel, the rights of confrontation and examination, 
and the privilege against self-incrimination.”89 
In accounting for the insufficiencies of juvenile court standards, the 
Supreme Court, in the middle of the twentieth century, granted Consti-
tutional due process procedures for all accused members of society. 
Again, this apparent triumph in rights and process also embodied a new 
perspective regarding adolescent criminals. These Constitutional protec-
tions afforded juveniles with rights and responsibilities. As a result, the 
trend following Winship involved transferring juveniles to criminal 
court. 
iii. Social Aftermath  
At the very least, Supreme Court decisions expanded the criticism 
of juvenile courts in the 1970s. In fact, many commentators interpreted 
the rulings as invalidating juvenile courts and their treatment of chil-
dren.90 Socially, the population of teenagers in America increased even 
more, and the crime rates spiked as well.91 Thus, the situation encour-
aged and simultaneously justified the practice of transferring juvenile 
offenders into criminal court. Criminal courts seemed to represent a so-
lution to apparent judicial abuses from juvenile court judges.  
Over time, the rhetoric also focused on the superior justiciability of 
criminal courts and the necessary punishment for heinous crimes. Coin-
ciding with Supreme Court cases, the United States Federal Govern-
ment committed resources to studying and understanding crime in the 
country. In particular, President Johnson created the Commission on 
Law Enforcement and the Administration of Justice in 1965.92 The goal 
of the Commission was to analyze crime in America, determine a cause 
for rising rates, and outline a set of solutions for the issue.93 Published 
                                                       
 89. Winship, 397 U.S. at 368.  
 90. See, e.g., Jennifer Park, Balancing Rehabilitation and Punishment: A Legisla-
tive Solution for Unconstitutional Juvenile Waiver Policies, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV.786, 796–
97 (2008); Barry C. Feld, Violent Youth and Public Policy: A Case Study of Juvenile Justice 
Law Reform, 79 MINN. L. REV. 965, 1071 (1995); Barbara Margaret Farrell, Pennsylvania’s 
Treatment of Children Who Commit Murder: Criminal Punishment Has Not Replaced 
Parens Patriae, 98 DICK. L. REV. 739, 751 (1994).  
 91. PRESTON ELROD & R. SCOTT RYDER: JUVENILE JUSTICE: A SOCIAL, HISTORICAL, 
AND LEGAL PERSPECTIVE 25 (2011); see also Shrestha & Heisler, supra note 40, at 15. 
 92. See President’s Comm’n on Law Enforcement and the Admin. Of Justice, Task 
Force Report, The Challenge of Crime in a Free Society 55–79 (1967). 
 93. Id.  
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in 1967, the Report concluded juvenile courts throughout the country 
did not satisfy the system’s initial goals and aspirations.94 In short, it 
stated the juvenile court system “has not succeeded significantly in re-
habilitating delinquent youth . . . or in bringing justice and compassion 
to the child offender.”95 Again, the coinciding suggestion was a different 
approach to the youth. The Report determined that delinquent behavior 
was prevalent and widespread, especially among the juveniles of the 
country and their involvement in less serious offenses.96  
In addition to the Report commissioned by the President, other pol-
iticians and researchers were simultaneously rejecting the rehabilita-
tion model that laid the foundation to the juvenile court system. The 
Quakers, who were instrumental in the early rehabilitative programs, 
explained that “after more than a century of persistent failure, this re-
formist prescription is bankrupt.”97 In 1978, Senator Kennedy wrote, 
“[S]entencing in America today under a scheme dominated by a rehabili-
tative philosophy is a national scandal.”98 Even more, a famous criminal 
law report called for a total restructuring of the philosophical founda-
tions of criminal punishments and procedures.99 The critique of rehabil-
itation focused on the inadequacy of sentencing discretion, the function 
of parole, and the uses of probation, among other items.100  
Overall, the academic and political sentiment moved away from re-
habilitation and towards retribution. By the end of the 1970s, a general-
ly pessimistic sentiment existed in the area of research and rehabilita-
tion of juveniles. Some researchers even called it the “Nothing Works” 
Doctrine.101 Between the 1970s and 1980s, states shifted their focus in 
juvenile law to punishment and deterrence.102 The shift coincided with 
several political taskforce publications, particularly in the form of Jus-
tice Reports.103 These taskforce reports generally concluded that the re-
habilitative model should be abandoned, given its inconsistencies, unex-
                                                       
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. at 80. 
 96. Id. at 55.  
 97. Working Party of the American Friends Service Committee, Struggle for Jus-
tice: A report on Crime and Punishment in America 8 (1971).  
 98. Edward M. Kennedy, Symposium on Sentencing Part I, Introduction, 7 
HOFSTRA L. REV. 1, 1 (1978). 
 99. Wayne Lafave & Austin W. Scott, Handbook on Criminal Law 23 (Jesse H. 
Chopper et al. eds., 1972). 
100. See generally Francis Allen, The Decline of the Rehabilitative Ideal: Penal Poli-
cy and Social Purpose (1981).  
101. See, e.g., Francis T. Cullen, Rehabilitation: Beyond Nothing Works, 42 CRIME & 
JUST. 299 (2013).  
102. Barry Krisberg & James F. Austin, Reinventing Juvenile Justice, 23 
CONTEMPORARY SOCIOLOGY 710, 710–11 (Sept. 1994). 
103. See generally J. Feinberg, Doing And Deserving: Essays in the Theory of Re-
sponsibility (1970); R. Singer, Just Deserts: Sentencing Based On Equality And Desert 
(1979); Alan M. Dershowitz, Fair And Certain Punishment: Report of the Twentieth Century 
Fund Task Force on Criminal Sentencing (1976). 
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pected and inhumane consequences, and exploitation.104 Additionally, 
the end of the 1970s saw reformation in criminal sentencing. After ini-
tial unsuccessful attempts to pass legislation, Congress succeeded in 
enacting the Sentencing Reform Act in 1984.105 Among other things, the 
Act combined the political rejection of the rehabilitative structure into 
general sentencing guidelines that judges and other judicial officials 
could utilize.106 Symbolically, it was this Act that signaled the removal 
of individualized sentencing and hopes for rehabilitation.  
D. National Juvenile Transfer Laws 
The transition away from a theory and practice of rehabilitation af-
fected the juvenile population and its position in the American court 
system. Due to the academic research, political discourse, new legisla-
tion, and statistical evidence, juveniles began to receive punishment for 
the sake of vengeance.107 At the time, most state juvenile court legisla-
tion had mechanisms through which serious juvenile offenders could be 
transferred into criminal court and treated as an adult.108 In many cas-
es, these transfer laws had originated with the inception of the juvenile 
courts.109 For instance, according to the Pennsylvania Juvenile Act that 
passed in 1933, an offender could be transferred into criminal court if he 
or she was “above the age of fourteen years” and charged with an offense 
that is “punishable by imprisonment in a State penitentiary.”110 In 
states where transfer was allowed, it often occurred without procedural 
formalities. However, it was precisely this issue that the Supreme Court 
addressed in Kent v. United States.111 The 1966 ruling made clear that 
decisions which impair a juvenile’s right to be heard in juvenile court 
could not occur “without ceremony.”112 Then, because of the increasing 
social and political pressure, more than half of the United States made 
                                                       
104. See generally J. Feinberg, Doing And Deserving: Essays in the Theory of Re-
sponsibility (1970); R. Singer, Just Deserts: Sentencing Based On Equality And Desert 
(1979); Alan M. Dershowitz, Fair And Certain Punishment: Report of the Twentieth Century 
Fund Task Force on Criminal Sentencing (1976). 
105. Chapter II of the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 
98 Stat. 1988 (1984).  
106. See generally id.  
107. See Krisberg & Austin, supra note 102, at 710–11. 
108. Feld, supra note 27, at 478. 
109. Id.  
110. Act of June 2, 1933, No. 311, § 18, 1933 Pa. Laws 1441; see also Com. ex. rel. 
Freeman v. Superintendent of State Corr. Inst. at Camp Hill, 242 A.2d 903, 905 (Pa. Super. 
Ct. 1968). 
111. Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 554 (1966). 
112. Id. 
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it easier to transfer juveniles to criminal court by 1976.113 These states 
struck a balance between constitutionality and transfer laws.114 First 
and foremost, the transfer laws needed to be constitutional following the 
United States Supreme Court decision in Kent, and as a result, states 
decided to utilize the criteria set forth in Kent as their new transfer pro-
visions.115 
One way states have transferred a juvenile into criminal court is 
through statutory exclusion. With statutory exclusion—also referred to 
as “statutory waiver,” “legislative exclusion,” and “mandatory waiver”—
a state statute is able to exclude particular offenses from the juvenile 
court’s authority altogether.116 Similar to the transfer laws, some of 
these statutory exclusions were in place at the inception of the juvenile 
court system, and thus pre-dated the Kent and Gault rulings. The 
aforementioned Pennsylvania Juvenile Act, for instance, contained stat-
utory language that excluded an individual from juvenile court if he or 
she was charged with murder.117 A statutory exclusion of this sort al-
lowed juveniles to be tried in criminal court without the heightened con-
stitutional scrutiny required by the Supreme Court. The most common 
method is designating the specific offenses in legislation that will ex-
clude a juvenile from juvenile court.118 Many states have utilized this 
legislative waiver, both before the 1960s Supreme Court cases and af-
ter.119 In 1987, Professor Feld effectively described the use of these stat-
utes in different states:  
The dates when these offense exclusions statutes were adopted 
are especially significant. Although the capital/life sentence ex-
clusions have been in the statutes for more than forty years in 
states such as Colorado, Indiana, Louisiana, Maryland, Missis-
sippi, and Vermont, thirteen of the present offense exclusion 
states have adopted or have expanded this strategy within the 
past fifteen years. Beginning in 1970, and in direct response to 
the Supreme Court's Kent decision, Congress excluded a cata-
logue of offenses from the jurisdiction of the juvenile courts of 
the District of Columbia. By 1975, four other states followed 
suit, and, by 1980, nine states excluded serious present offenses 
                                                       
113. See Krisberg & Austin, supra note 102, at 710–11. 
114. See Feld, supra note 27, at 489–490.  
115. See, e.g., Feld, supra note 27, at 490. 
116. See Rachel Jacobs, Waving Goodbye to Due Process: The Juvenile Waiver Sys-
tem, 19 CARDOZO J. L. & GENDER 989, 1000–01 (2013).  
117. Act of June 2, 1933, supra note 110.  
118. See, e.g., Feld, supra note 27, at 508–10 (providing the examples of California, 
Delaware, Georgia, Indiana, Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, New Mexico, Virginia, and Wash-
ington as states with specific present offense waiver statutes. These states are in addition to 
the nearly 20 states that list present offenses or prior records to be considered for waiver.). 
119. Id. at 505–07 (Table listing the year each waiver statute was added to state leg-
islation). 
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from juvenile court jurisdiction. The remaining states have acted 
similarly since 1980.120 
As expected, even more changes have occurred since the publication of 
Professor Feld’s report. In many cases, states have added additional cat-
egories to their legislative waiver statutes.121 The trend, then, is to des-
ignate certain serious offenses in the state statute in order to try juve-
niles in criminal court. 
Not every juvenile transfer into criminal court is the result of legis-
lative waiver statutes. A waiver can also occur through the prosecutor’s 
discretion, in what is called “prosecutorial waiver,” “concurrent jurisdic-
tion,” or “direct file.”122 In such a case, prosecutors decide whether a 
case is filed in juvenile court or adult criminal court.123 This prosecuto-
rial transfer method arose most commonly after the Supreme Court cas-
es of the 1960s and 1970s, and employed the notion that concurrent ju-
risdiction was available to the juvenile and criminal courts.124 In this 
way, it is the prosecutor’s decision to determine the forum, and this 
choice cannot be appealed.125 Although it does not compel the transfer 
of the juvenile like the legislative waiver, the prosecutorial transfer 
method has received significant criticism due to the ease of transfer, the 
dependence upon the prosecutor, and the potential for abuse.126 In other 
words, prosecutorial waiver “raises concerns of arbitrariness, since it is 
not always subject to judicial review . . . [and] the decision frequently 
depends on the philosophy of the prosecutor and judge, the political cli-
mate, the publicity surrounding the offenses, and the make-up of the 
                                                       
120. Feld, supra note 27, at 517. 
121. See, e.g., Francis Barry McCarthy, The Serious Offender and Juvenile Court Re-
form: The Case for Prosecutorial Waiver of Juvenile Court Jurisdiction, 38 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 
629, 655 n.134 (1994) (noting examples of expansion in the use of legislative waiver in Okla-
homa, Rhode Island, Hawaii, Montana, and New Jersey in the years between 1987 and 
1994).  
122. See generally Lisa A. Cintron, Rehabilitating the Juvenile Court System: Limit-
ing Juvenile Transfers to Adult Criminal Court, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 1254 (1996).  
123. See Donna M. Bishop & Charles E. Frazier, Transfer of Juveniles to Criminal 
Court: A Case Study and Analysis of Prosecutorial Waiver, 5 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & 
PUB. POL’Y 281, 284–85 (1991). 
124. Id. at 285.  
125. Dean J. Champion & G. Larry Mays, Transferring Juveniles to Criminal 
Courts: Trends and Implications for Criminal Justice 72 (1991). 
126. See, e.g., Julie B. Falis, Statutory Exclusion—When the Prosecutor Becomes the 
Abuser, 32 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 81, 94 (1998); Robert O. Dawson, An Empirical Study of Kent 
Style Juvenile Transfers to Criminal Court, 23 ST. MARY’S L.J. 975, 1001 (1992); Deborah L. 
Johnson, Debra E. Banister, & Michelle L. Alm, The Violent Youth Offender and Juvenile 
Transfer to the Adult Criminal Court, 2004 J. INST. JUST. INT’L. STUD. 84, 89 (2004). 
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community.”127 Despite its drawbacks, prosecutorial waiver usage has 
increased more than four times since the 1970s.128 
A third method to transfer an individual out of juvenile court and 
into criminal court is through judicial waiver. As the centerpiece of the 
decision in Kent, judicial waiver is the original transfer methodology in 
which a judge determines whether a juvenile ought to be transferred 
and tried in criminal court.129 Although judges often exercise their dis-
cretion according to the applicable state statute and the elements from 
Kent,130 the final decision is theirs alone to make. On one hand, this 
process allows for an individualized determination based on a variety of 
factors.131 However, on the other hand, the judge often incorporates the 
prosecutor’s suggestions to simplify the procedure, is frequently influ-
enced by the juvenile’s race, and typically makes inconsistent rulings.132 
Nevertheless, all but five states utilize judicial waiver in some form.133  
E. Idaho Juvenile Transfer Laws 
Originally enacted in 1977, Idaho’s judicial waiver statute originat-
ed as part of the state’s Youth Rehabilitation Act and allows for the 
transfer of juveniles into adult criminal court.134 The original statute 
permitted a waiver of the juvenile jurisdiction and the transfer to adult 
proceedings as long as the child was at least fourteen years of age and 
was “alleged to have committed an act . . . [which would be a crime if 
committed by an adult].”135 Similar to other states at the time, the leg-
islation lists many of the factors from the Kent Supreme Court case136 
as a way to identify the issues when determining whether to waive the 
juvenile court’s jurisdiction.137 Then, in 1981, Idaho added a legislative 
                                                       
127. Chelsea Dunn, Condemning Our Youth to Lives as Criminals: Incarcerating 
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waiver section (§ 16-1806A) to its Code to provide the definitions of vio-
lent offenses and to outline the proper proceedings against the offend-
ers.138 This 1981 addition conformed with the national trend to deline-
ate the offenses that result in mandatory transfer to criminal court. The 
1981 addition mandated automatic transfer of a juvenile to the adult 
criminal court system if he or she was charged with any one of the fol-
lowing five violent crimes: murder of any degree or attempted murder; 
robbery; rape (excluding statutory rape); mayhem; and assault or bat-
tery with the intent to commit any of the aforementioned crimes.139  
In 1984, the Idaho legislature amended the list of violent offenses, 
adding “forcible sexual penetration by the use of a foreign object” and 
“infamous crimes against nature, committed by force or violence.”140 
Also, the scope widened even further, so that all other crimes (felonies 
or misdemeanors) charged in the complaint will proceed as an adult in 
every respect.141 The expansion continued in 1990, when the section 
added a controlled substance violation to the crimes delineated for man-
datory transfer.142 In this way, a juvenile caught with a controlled sub-
stance within 1,000 feet of any school, as well as any structure used for 
a school activity, would be transferred as a matter of law to adult crimi-
nal court.143  
                                                                                                                                
violent, premeditated, or willful manner; (c) Whether the alleged offense was against persons 
or property, greater weight being given to offenses against persons; (d) The maturity of the 
child as determined by considerations of his home, environment, emotional attitude, and 
pattern of living; (e) The juvenile's record and previous history of contacts with the juvenile 
corrections system; (f) The likelihood that the juvenile will develop competency and life skills 
to become a contributing member of the community by use of facilities and resources availa-
ble to the court; (g) The amount of weight to be given to each of the factors listed in subsec-
tion (8) of this section is discretionary with the court, and a determination that the minor is 
not a fit and proper subject to be dealt with under the juvenile court law may be based on 
any one (1) or a combination of the factors set forth within this section, which shall be recited 
in the order of waiver.”  IDAHO CODE § 16-1806(8) (2016) (amended and resdesignated in 
1995 as IDAHO CODE § 20-508(8) (2016)). 
138. IDAHO CODE § 16-1806A (2016) (amended and resdesignated in 1995 as IDAHO 
CODE § 20-509 (2016)). 
139. IDAHO CODE § 16-1806A(1)(a-g) (2016) (amended and resdesignated in 1995 as 
IDAHO CODE § 20-509(a–j) (2016)). 
140. IDAHO CODE § 16-1806A (2016) (amended and resdesignated in 1995 as IDAHO 
CODE § 20-509 (2016)). 
141. Id. 
142. Id. 
143. “A violation of the provisions of section 37-2732(a)(1)(A)(B) or (C), Idaho Code, 
when the violation occurred on or within one thousand (1,000) feet of the property of any 
public or private primary or secondary school, or in those portions of any building, park, 
stadium or other structure or grounds which were, at the time of the violation, being used for 
an activity sponsored by or through such a school.” IDAHO CODE § 16-1806A(1)(h) (2016) 
(amended and resdesignated in 1995 as IDAHO CODE § 20-509(1)(i) (2016)). 
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Consequently, Idaho legislation provides a variety of methods in 
which a young offender can be transferred out of juvenile court. If a 
specified crime has allegedly been committed, a fourteen-year-old will 
automatically waive his or her right to participate in juvenile court due 
to Idaho’s statute.144 Even more, after any criminal act by a minor of any 
age, a judge or prosecutor can make a motion to transfer the juvenile 
into criminal court system.145 The number and scope of offenses in the 
mandatory waiver statute, as well as the addition of a judicial waiver 
option that applies to any crime, makes Idaho’s juvenile transfer laws 
some of the most extensive in the United States. Although the average 
national transfer age is at least sixteen years old, Idaho uses one of the 
youngest mandatory ages in the country, and allows for even younger 
upon hearing.146 Even the original list of violent offenses, in 1981, con-
tained more offenses than the majority of other states.147 Idaho may not 
have the absolute youngest age for automatic waiver or the longest list 
of statutory offenses, but the combination of quantity and character of 
the transfer statutes allows for an atmosphere in Idaho that frequently 
tries juveniles as adults in the state’s criminal courts.  
Idaho’s automatic transfer rule violates the specific Due Process 
requirements set forth in Kent. The Supreme Court in Kent clearly ex-
pressed that a court must take care to consider unique factors when it 
determines jurisdiction for the case and issues a sentence to a juvenile 
offender.148 The Kent decision famously indicated the eight particular 
factors a court must weigh in this determination.149 Following the judi-
cial ruling, Idaho incorporated all these factors into its legislation in 
some degree, as a protective measure and to ensure the constitutionality 
of its statute.150 To that extent, the Idaho legislation had successfully 
implemented the Supreme Court holding into its state law. However, an 
amendment in 1981—to automatically mandate transfer for certain vio-
lent crimes—changed Idaho’s position in the matter.151 
Since the introduction of ID Code § 16-1806A—now § 20-509—the 
state has abandoned the Supreme Court precedent in Kent and the re-
quirement of individual consideration. The legislation allowed for excep-
tions to the eight specific factors and failed to mandate them in every 
juvenile case. Instead of a procedural requirement, the consideration of 
such factors now only applies to specific crimes and specific hearings.152 
However, if the prosecution alleges murder, robbery, rape, mayhem, as-
                                                       
144. See IDAHO CODE § 20-509 (2016). 
145. Id. 
146. Feld, supra note 27, at 512–13. 
147. Id.  
148. Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 543 (1966).  
149. See Feld, supra note 132, at 704–05. 
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sault, forcible sexual penetration, or a controlled substance violation 
near a school, then the juvenile court automatically waives its jurisdic-
tion without utilizing the precise factors from Kent.153  Thus, by auto-
matically transferring a juvenile into criminal court and trying him or 
her as an adult, Idaho courts fail to consider the age, maturity, level of 
culpability, and potential for rehabilitation.  
Kent held that a proceeding must provide a hearing, effective coun-
sel, and legitimate reasons before waiving the juvenile court jurisdiction 
and trying a youth in an adult criminal court.154 The Court sought to 
protect juveniles from thoughtless mandates and automation, and thus 
prioritized the hearings in which juvenile offenders receive individual 
consideration.155 The holding required that a full investigation and 
hearing occur before the transfer, since the move into adult criminal 
court is of consequence in itself. 
Idaho’s mandatory transfer statute is contradictory to the holding 
and reasoning in Kent. Although the Kent factors apply in some instanc-
es in Idaho, they are ignored for many circumstances, solely due to the 
crime committed.156 As a consequence of specific enumerated crimes, 
Idaho’s youths are automatically and irreversibly move into criminal 
court for adult criminal sentencing, without the required hearing that 
considers culpability and amenability to rehabilitation.157 Idaho juve-
nile courts release their jurisdiction according to the charged offenses 
and without a hearing. Since Kent found a violation of due process when 
the D.C. juvenile court failed to hold a hearing or investigate allegations 
for a fourteen-year-old, Idaho’s statute is a Constitutional violation be-
cause it allows for automatic transfers based only on the alleged of-
fense.158 In the event that the alleged crime is one enumerated in ID 
Code § 20-509, the juvenile’s fate is determined.159 Thus, insofar as Kent 
requires a hearing, counsel, and legitimate due process, the Idaho trans-
fer rules violate the Supreme Court precedent.160 
F. Recent Supreme Court Rulings on Juveniles in Criminal Courts 
While state legislatures passed laws concerning juvenile rights and 
their position in the court system, the United States Supreme Court also 
                                                       
153. Id. at § 20-509(1). 
154. Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 554 (1966). 
155. Id. at 553.  
156. IDAHO CODE § 20-509(1) (2016). 
157. See Kent, 383 U.S. at 567.  
158. See id.  
159. IDAHO CODE § 20-509(1) (2016). 
160. See Kent, 383 U.S. at 567. 
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addressed the issue.161 As a result of state legislation and juvenile trans-
fer laws, more severe sentences were imposed upon youth who were 
tried as adults, without the sentencing limits or protections that often 
exist in juvenile court.162 State courts penalized violent offenders as 
though they were competent adults, and issued sentences accordingly.163 
Within the last ten years, the Supreme Court decided three cases con-
cerning juveniles and their position within the criminal court system.164 
The rulings have resounding national consequences with regard to juve-
niles, as well as psychological, social, and scientific conclusions about 
mental and physical capacity. 
i. New Rulings Uphold Juvenile Rights and Issue Protections for Minors  
As more juveniles were more frequently tried in the adult criminal 
court system, the Supreme Court initially had a difficult time deciding 
the constitutionality of extended sentences. One major ruling came in 
1988, when the Court prohibited the execution of any criminals under 
sixteen years of age, even if they committed violent crimes.165 In its rul-
ing, the Court reasoned that “the potential deterrent value of the death 
sentence is insignificant . . . .”166 However, it took only one year for the 
discourse surrounding capital punishment and its effectiveness to re-
verse course. In Stanford v. Kentucky, the Supreme Court found that an 
individual who murders at the age of sixteen can be punished by death, 
and such a punishment “does not offend the Eighth Amendment’s prohi-
bition against cruel and unusual punishment.”167 The Court found evi-
dence for its opinion in historical and societal consensus.168  
Like a pendulum, this attitude and social acceptance used in Stan-
ford inverted by 2005, when the Supreme Court overruled itself once 
again. That year, in Roper v. Simmons, the Court distinctly abrogated 
the ruling in Stanford and held that the Eighth and Fourteenth 
Amendments prohibit the execution of all individuals who committed 
crimes before they turned eighteen.169 In Roper, the seventeen-year-old 
defendant and his two friends planned and executed the murder of a 
woman.170 After breaking and entering her home, the defendant tied up 
the victim and threw her off a bridge, where she drowned in the water 
below.171 At trial in Missouri, the defendant was convicted of first-
                                                       
 
 
 
  
165. Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 837–38 (1988).  
166. Id. at 837.  
167. Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 380 (1989), abrogated by Roper v. Sim-
mons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005). 
168. Id. 
169. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 555 (2005). 
170. Id. at 556. 
171. Id. at 557.  
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degree murder and sentenced to death.172 However, the Missouri Su-
preme Court reversed the trial court’s decision, citing the Eighth 
Amendment.173  In its appellate review, the United States Supreme 
Court again looked to social opinion and evolving standards,174 but this 
time noted how the majority of states were trending away from the 
death penalty for juveniles.175 The Court took particular care to dissect 
the Eighth Amendment and whether a penalty of death is unconstitu-
tional for a juvenile.176 After some analysis, the Court concluded that a 
juvenile should not be subject to “the most severe punishment” because 
juveniles are different from adults in their sense of responsibility, their 
vulnerability to negative influences and outside pressure, and their for-
mation of character.177 Furthermore, the death penalty fails to satisfy 
the goals of retribution or deterrence in a juvenile.178 Consequently, the 
Supreme Court overruled Stanford v. Kentucky and held that the 
“Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments forbid imposition of the death 
penalty on offenders who were under the age of 18 when their crimes 
were committed.”179 
The Supreme Court considered extended juvenile sentencing five 
years later, when it heard the case Graham v. Florida.180 When the de-
fendant was sixteen years old, he attempted to rob a barbeque restau-
rant with three other young men.181 During the robbery attempt, the 
defendant’s accomplice used a metal bar to strike a worker in the 
head.182 Charged for armed robbery, the defendant was tried as an 
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necessarily embodies a moral judgment. The standard itself remains the same, but its ap-
plicability must change as the basic mores of society change.” Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 
238, 382 (1972) (Burger, C.J., dissenting).  
175. Roper, 543 U.S. at 564 (noting that 30 states prohibit the death penalty for in-
dividuals under 18 years of age); Id. at 575–78 (explaining the national and international 
trend towards abolishing the juvenile death penalty).  
176. See id.  
177. Id. at 568–70. 
178. Id. at 571.  
179. Id. at 578.  
180. Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010).  
181. Id. at 53. 
182. Id.  
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adult under Florida law and received three years of probation under a 
plea agreement.183 While on probation, the defendant attempted several 
more robberies, one of which ended in a high-speed chase and an ar-
rest.184 The trial court found the defendant guilty of armed burglary 
and attempted armed robbery, and sentenced him to the maximum sen-
tences for each crime respectively, which was life imprisonment and fif-
teen years.185 The Florida Court of Appeals affirmed the sentences, not-
ing the violent nature of the offenses and the culpability of this seven-
teen-year-old.186  
On appeal to the Supreme Court, the majority analyzed the nation-
al consensus and the legislation of the states.187 Even though thirty-
seven states allowed life sentences without parole, the Court considered 
the frequency of these sentences in order to determine the national 
trend and sentiment.188 Through this perspective, the Court concluded 
that even the states that allowed juvenile life sentences were infre-
quently utilizing them.189 Combining this trend with some evidence 
from Roper, the Supreme Court explained the unfortunate position of 
juveniles with respect to punishment and extended prison sentences. 
The majority opinion noted the severity of the life sentence without pa-
role, especially for juveniles, who are less deserving of severe punish-
ments, will spend a greater percentage of life in prison, and achieve few 
of the intended penological benefits.190 For these reasons, the Court 
held, “The Constitution prohibits the imposition of a life without parole 
sentence on a juvenile offender who did not commit homicide.”191 
The Supreme Court’s analysis in Graham produced a categorical 
rule for juveniles and the sentences they can receive. Although the sen-
tence in question did not involve the death penalty, it was extreme 
enough to warrant a complete analysis as to the position of juveniles 
and the effectiveness of punishment. As a result, the Court weighed the 
constitutionality of the life sentence without the possibility of parole in a 
manner that incorporated scientific characteristics and the components 
of the Eighth Amendment. The implication of Graham, then, is seen on 
the entire practice of sentencing juveniles, and contributes to a univer-
sal effect.192 Consequently, the Supreme Court was willing to hear and 
rule upon a similar case two years later in Miller v. Alabama.193  
                                                       
183. Id. at 54.  
184. Id. at 54–55.  
185. Id. at 57.  
186. Graham, 560 U.S. at 58. 
187. Id. at 62. 
188. Id.  
189. Id. 
190. See id. at 68–72.  
191. Id. at 82. 
192. See Graham, 560 U.S. at 61–62. The alternative (and one that is much more 
common) is a challenge to the defendant’s own sentence in particular. To this effect, the 
Court goes to length to distinguish the defendant’s case from other seemingly similar issues: 
“The present case involves an issue the Court has not considered previously: a categorical 
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In Miller, the Supreme Court considered two cases that involved 
juveniles convicted of murder at the age of fourteen.194 Both young men 
were sentenced at the lower courts to life imprisonment without the op-
portunity of parole.195 One case, Miller v. State, involved a juvenile 
named Evan Miller who attacked his mother’s drug dealer with a base-
ball bat.196 In order to hide evidence of the crime, Miller and his friend 
set fire to the drug dealer’s trailer, resulting in his death.197 The state 
charged the juvenile with murder in the course of arson, which holds a 
mandatory sentence of life without parole.198 The companion case to 
Miller was Jackson v. Norris.199 There, the defendant named Kuntrell 
Jackson waited outside while his two friends used a shotgun to rob a 
video store.200 When the shop owner refused and threatened to call the 
police, one friend shot and killed him.201 Through the Arkansas stat-
ute,202 the state prosecuted Jackson as an adult, and charged him with 
a capital felony murder and aggravated robbery. Like Miller, Jackson 
was sentenced to life in jail without parole, and the United States Su-
preme Court granted the petition for certiorari.203  
In the Miller opinion, the Court concluded that the respective 
states’ mandatory prison sentences were unconstitutional. In both cases, 
the laws “mandated that each juvenile die in prison even if a judge or 
jury thought that his youth and its attendant characteristics, along with 
nature of his crime” demanded a lesser sentence.204 The Court held that 
the sentences of life without the possibility of parole for juveniles were 
unconstitutional for two particular reasons. Firstly, the Supreme Court 
had previously barred any capital punishment or life without parole 
                                                                                                                                
challenge to a term-of-years sentence. The approach in [other] cases ... is suited for consider-
ing a gross proportionality challenge to a particular defendant's sentence, but here a sentenc-
ing practice itself is in question. This case implicates a particular type of sentence as it ap-
plies to an entire class of offenders who have committed a range of crimes. As a result, a 
threshold comparison between the severity of the penalty and the gravity of the crime does 
not advance the analysis. Here, in addressing the question presented, the appropriate analy-
sis is the one used in cases that involved the categorical approach.”   
193. Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012). 
194. Id. at 2460. 
195. Id. 
196. Miller v. State, 63 So. 3d 676 (Ala. Crim. App. 2010), rev'd, 132 S. Ct. 2455 
(2012). 
197. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2460. 
198. Id. at 2463; See ALA. CODE § 13A-5-40(a)(9) (2013); ALA. CODE § 13A-6-2(c) 
(2013).  
199. 378 S.W.3d 103 (Ark. 2011), rev'd, 132 S. Ct. at 2455 (2012). 
200. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2461.  
201. Id. 
202. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-27-318(c)(2) (2011). 
203. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2463. 
204. Id. at 2460. 
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sentences for juveniles who commited non-homicide crimes.205 The 
Court intentionally imposed categorical bans on such sentencing prac-
tices in Roper and Graham, particularly because the culpability of the 
juveniles and the severity of the sentence were so disproportionately 
imbalanced.206 Secondly, the Supreme Court had previously ruled that 
justices must impose sentences based on the characteristics of the ac-
cused and the details of his offense.207 By combining precedent of previ-
ous decisions, the Court in Miller held that juveniles are entitled to in-
dividualized consideration before receiving a sentence of life without the 
possibility of parole.208 Thus, this sentence, as well as any statute man-
dating such a sentence, would violate the Eighth Amendment.  
ii. Objective Criteria and its Role in an Evolving Penalty Standard 
Through its ruling in Miller, the Supreme Court endorsed the 
trending attitudes of the nation, conforming to what it claimed were 
“evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing 
society [standards within society].”209 The Court determined society’s 
standards with a consideration of objective factors such as state legisla-
tion, as well as justifications for sentencing.210 An analysis of the legis-
lation alone revealed that still twenty-nine states allowed the juvenile 
sentencing of life without parole, yet, the majority concluded that no 
national consensus was needed in this regard.211  
Although the Supreme Court in Miller was not the first to utilize 
social standards and objective indicia,212 it used this evidence to reject 
the harsh penalties imposed on juveniles. To decide if a punishment is 
cruel and unusual, and thus in violation of the Eighth Amendment, the 
                                                       
205. Id. at 2463; see generally Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005); Graham v. 
Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010).  
206. See generally Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005); Graham v. Florida, 560 
U.S. 48 (2010).  
207. See Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976), where the United States 
Supreme Court held that the death sentence imposed by the lower court was unconstitution-
al insofar as it violated the 8th and 14th Amendments. The Court stated, “While the prevail-
ing practice of individualizing sentencing determinations generally reflects simply enlight-
ened policy rather than a constitutional imperative, we believe that in capital cases the fun-
damental respect for humanity underlying the Eighth Amendment requires consideration of 
the character and record of the individual offender and the circumstances of the particular 
offense as a constitutionally indispensable part of the process of inflicting the penalty of 
death.” Id. at 304; see also Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978). 
208. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2469. 
209. Id. at 2463.  
210. Id. at 2465–70.  
211. Id. at 2471.  
212. See, e.g., Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 277 (1972) (stating, “we must make 
certain that the judicial determination is as objective as possible”); Weems v. United States, 
217 U.S. 349, 380 (1910) (arguing that the Court must consider how different jurisdictions 
evaluate the mode of punishment); Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459, 462 
(1947) (suggesting that the Court ought to use historical and jurisdictional usage in order to 
determine acceptability of punishments). 
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Supreme Court has also considered objective factors.213 Some of the ob-
jective factors arise in the form of statutes that are passed by the elected 
officials of society.214 In this regard, the Court presumes statutes writ-
ten by democratically elected representatives are constitutional.215 The 
statutes containing the objective factors reflect the will of the electorate, 
which include citizens of the nation. But even more, the Supreme Court 
uses the objective factors to determine social acceptance of a punish-
ment.216 Justice Brennan delivered this idea of social acceptance in his 
concurring opinion of Furman v. Georgia: 
The question under this principle, then, is whether there are ob-
jective indicators from which a court can conclude that contem-
porary society considers a severe punishment unacceptable. Ac-
cordingly, the judicial task is to review the history of a chal-
lenged punishment and to examine society's present practices 
with respect to its use.217 
This goal to determine social acceptance through objective means 
also incorporates science. In fact, one of the most important objective 
factors is research by developmental and neurological scientists that 
explores psychological differences between adults and minors. The use 
of science emerged in Roper, when the Supreme Court reasoned that 
juveniles, by their nature, have a diminished capacity when compared to 
adults.218 Thus, according to Roper, the scientific nature of juveniles 
indicates that they cannot be part of the class who deserves the death 
penalty.219 The Court in Roper explicitly noted the scientific consensus 
at the time of its ruling (2005).220 Subsequent cases continue to cite the 
Roper science as authoritative and give no reason to reconsider the is-
sues.221 Roper conclusively explains three main differences between 
adults and juveniles.222 First, minors possess a “lack of maturity and 
underdeveloped sense of responsibility” which often results in “impetu-
                                                       
213. See Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 369 (1989); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 
584, 592 (1977). 
214. See McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 300 (1987).  
215. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 175 (1976).  
216. See, e.g., Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459, 462 (1947) (sug-
gesting that the Court ought to use historical and jurisdictional usage in order to determine 
acceptability of punishments). 
217. Furman, 408 U.S. at 278–79.  
218. Roper, 543 U.S. at 570.  
219. Id. at 569–71. 
220. Id. 
221. See Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 68 (2010) (“No recent data provide reason 
to reconsider the Court's observations in Roper about the nature of juveniles.”). 
222. Roper, 543 U.S. at 569–70. 
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ous and ill-considered actions and decisions.”223 To support this conten-
tion, the Court cites data that adolescents disproportionately engage in 
reckless behavior in every regard.224 Then, to further the point, the 
holding notes how every state recognizes the immaturity and irrespon-
sibility of children by not allowing citizens under the age of eighteen to 
vote or serve on juries.225 Second, “juveniles are more vulnerable or sus-
ceptible to negative influences and outside pressures, including peer 
pressure.”226 The Court supports this second factor with evidence that 
juveniles have less control than adults over their environment.227 Third, 
“the character of a juvenile is not as well formed as that of an adult.”228 
Overall, the holding in Roper integrated the scientific conclusions about 
juveniles in order to rule that even if the crime is heinous, a minor is a 
different type of offender than an adult. Youth are immature, irrational, 
irresponsible, vulnerable, and struggling to find an identity, and their 
actions fail to indicate depraved character. Roper then used all of these 
findings to support a holding that disallowed the execution of individu-
als younger than eighteen.229 
The Supreme Court continued to address the contrasts between ju-
veniles and adults while maintaining its focus on the differences in sci-
entific discoveries. In Graham, the Court agreed with the scientific find-
ings from Roper in a decision that reached beyond the issue of life sen-
tences for non-homicidal crimes.230 In Graham, the Court imposed its 
categorical analysis to non-homicide juvenile offenders, and relied on 
developments in neuroscience for support.231 The Court used scientific 
studies to explain the fundamental differences between youth and adult 
brains, before agreeing with Roper that it is “misguided to equate the 
failings of a minor with those of an adult.”232 As evidence, the majority 
spoke of the early psychological and sociological theories about juvenile 
brain development, and then reinforced these ideas with current trends 
and advancements in neurological studies.233 The Court then concluded 
that “parts of the brain involved in behavior continue to mature through 
late adolescence.”234 Also, juveniles have more of an ability to change in 
the future, and therefore their behavior is less of an indication of de-
                                                       
223. Id. at 569 (quoting Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S. 350, 367 (1993)). 
224. Id. (citing Jeffrey Arnett, Reckless Behavior in Adolescence: A Developmental 
Perspective, 12 DEVELOPMENTAL REV. 339 (1992)). 
225. Id. 
226. Id.  
227. Id. (citing Laurence Steinberg & Elizabeth S. Scott, Less Guilty by Reason of 
Adolescence: Developmental Immaturity, Diminished Responsibility, and the Juvenile Death 
Penalty, 58 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 1009, 1014 (2003)). 
228. Roper, 543 U.S. at 570.  
229. Id. at 572. 
230. Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 68–69 (2010). 
231. Id. at 61–62.  
232. Id. at 68; Roper, 543 U.S. at 570.  
233. Graham, 560 U.S. at 68. 
234. Id. at 68.  
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praved character.235 The result is then that psychology and brain sci-
ence proved—even in 2010 when the opinion released—“fundamental 
differences between juvenile and adult minds.”236  
Related to the Supreme Court’s rationale, scientific data continues 
to support these differences between adults and juveniles. MRI brain 
scans show that the frontal lobe is essential for “volition, planning, se-
lection, sequential organization, and self-monitoring of actions.”237 The 
frontal cortices are used during high-level reasoning, regulation of emo-
tion, goal planning, comprehension, and impulse control.238 However, 
this critically important frontal lobe is not fully developed until adult-
hood.239 The normal brains of minors are in the process of developing, 
which impacts the neurological processes of youth.240 Studies demon-
strate the comparative effects of such underdevelopment when the same 
task requires adolescents to utilize different brain processes than 
adults.241 Thus, with the multitude of functional brain imaging results, 
scientists have made the connection between the neurological and the 
behavioral. One expert concluded, “[t]o the extent that transformations 
occurring in adolescent brains contribute to the characteristic behavior-
al predispositions of adolescence, adolescent behavior is in part biologi-
cally determined.”242 
Neurological studies also focus on the link between adolescent be-
havior and its scientific explanation. For instance, studies note the bio-
logical explanation for risk-taking behavior, especially related to the 
changing frontal brain regions.243 These risks are often characterized by 
                                                       
235. Id.  
236. Id. 
237. Celine Chayer & Morris Freedman, Frontal Lobe Functions, 1 CURRENT 
NEUROLOGY & NEUROSCIENCE REP. 547, 547 (2001). 
238. See Michael S. Gazzaniga et al., Cognitive Neuroscience 75 (2002).  
239. See, e.g., Elizabeth R. Sowell et al., In Vivo Evidence for Post-Adolescent Brain 
Maturation in Frontal and Striatal Regions, 2 NATURE NEUROSCIENCE 859, 860 (10th ed. 
1999) (revealing the differences in maturation of brain regions from childhood to young 
adulthood, with use of an MRI); Jay N. Giedd et al., Brain Development During Childhood 
and Adolescence: A Longitudinal MRI Study, 2 NATURE NEUROSCIENCE 861, 861–62 (10th 
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240. See Tomás Paus et al., Structural Maturation of Neural Pathways in Children 
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24 NEUROSCIENCE & BIOBEHAVIORAL REVS. 417, 447 (2000). 
243. Id. at 421–24; Laurence Steinberg, Risk-Taking in Adolescence: What Changes, 
and Why?, 1021 ANNALS N.Y. ACAD. SCI. 51, 57 (2006) (concluding, “[m]y argument is that 
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behavior-seeking stimuli that produce sensations, pleasures, and re-
wards.244 Other studies connect the propensity of alcohol consumption 
with the underdeveloped brain.245 Tests also determine that an adoles-
cent brain experiences more pleasure and addictive tendencies from to-
bacco than an adult brain.246 The substance influences relate to the re-
search on forethought, which concludes that adolescents possess weak 
future-orientation, fail to effectively anticipate consequences, and disre-
gard risk.247 The massive amount of neurological and behavioral science 
led some researchers and scholars to reconsider free will and culpability 
in the criminal law context.248 Even more modest commentators note 
the new and necessary role of neuroscience in determining rationali-
ty.249 
Overall, the Supreme Court decisions in Furman, Roper, Graham, 
and then most recently in Miller, reveal several important principles. 
First, the Court is looking to objective criteria to determine the social 
and scientific attitudes with regard to juvenile status and punish-
ment.250 Second, and very much related to the new social and scientific 
trends, the Court is incorporating these objective items into its decision-
making.251 The majority opinions utilize data from neurological studies 
                                                                                                                                
heightened risk taking during this period is likely to be normative, biologically driven, and 
inevitable.”).  
244. See Laurence Steinberg, A Dual Systems Model of Adolescent Risk-Taking, 52 
DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOBIOLOGY 216, 217 (2010).  
245. L.P. Spear, The Adolescent Brain and the College Drinker: Biological Basis of 
Propensity to Use and Misuse Alcohol, J. STUD. ON ALCOHOL & DRUGS, Supp. 14, at 71, 77 
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of alcohol and other drugs.”). 
246. See Theodore A. Slotkin, Nicotine and the Adolescent Brain: Insights from an 
Animal Model, 24 NEUROTOXICOLOGY & TERATOLOGY 369, 369 (2002) (“Effects of nicotine on 
critical components of reward pathways and circuits involved in learning, memory and mood 
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seen in adolescent smokers.”); see also Jennifer M. Brielmaier et al., Immediate and Long-
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NEUROTOXICOLOGY & TERATOLOGY 74, 74 (2007) (finding that one dose of nicotine rewards 
the brain of an adolescent rat more than the brain of an adult rat).  
247. See Laurence Steinberg et al., Age Differences in Future Orientation and Delay 
Discounting, 80 CHILD. DEV. 28, 29–30 (2009). 
248. See, e.g., Joshua Greene & Jonathan Cohen, For the Law, Neuroscience Changes 
Nothing and Everything, in Law and the Brain, 359 PHIL. TRANS. R. SOC. LOND. B. SCI. 1775 
(2004).  
249. See, e.g., Stephen J. Morse, New Neuroscience, Old Problems, in Neuroscience 
and the Law, 6 CEREBRUM 81 (2004); J.A. Silva, Forensic Psychiatry, Neuroscience, and the 
Law, 37 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY LAW 489 (2009). 
250. See generally Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012); Graham v. Florida, 560 
U.S. 48, 68–69 (2010); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 
238, 382 (1972). 
251. See Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012); Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 
68–69 (2010); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 382 
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and trending legislatures as evidence.252 From these interpretations, 
the Supreme Court has indicated a split between youth and adults in 
regard to maturity, brain development, decision-making, forethought, 
potential for future rehabilitation, and generalized character.253 The 
distinction between the two groups reinforces the need to use different 
processes and strategies for punishment. The recent Supreme Court rul-
ings generally stand for the proposition that certain extreme punish-
ments are unfit and unconstitutional for juvenile offenders. Additional-
ly, the Court is willing to consider the juvenile offender in a unique way, 
suggesting explicitly and implicitly that sentencing determinations 
ought to be conducted on an individualized and case-by-case basis. It is 
from these procedures and principles that state legislation exhibits bad 
policy if it automatically transfers a juvenile offender into criminal court 
because this procedure fails to account for the neurological differences, 
fails to provide protections for a vulnerable subsection of criminals, and 
fails to fulfill any justifiable punishment goals. 
III. IDAHO’S MANDATORY JUVENILE TRANSFER LAWS ARE BAD 
POLICY  
Idaho’s mandatory transfer legislation is bad policy because it vio-
lates the rulings and reasoning of the United States Supreme Court. 
The Supreme Court has held that youth must be analyzed uniquely, ac-
cording to their situation, and with flexibility based on neurological sci-
ence that demonstrates their vulnerability.254 The Court concludes au-
tomatic transfer of juveniles violates Due Process and mandatory sen-
tences of these offenders are unconstitutional.255 Because of these rul-
ings, the Idaho transfer statute is bad policy because it refuses to judge 
each juvenile individually, fails to address the differences between juve-
nile and adult brain development, and denies the offender a chance to 
rehabilitate.   
                                                       
252. See generally Marty Beyer, Immaturity, Culpability & Competency in Juve-
niles: A Case Study of 17 Cases, 15 CRIM. JUST. 27 (2000). 
253. See Graham, 560 U.S. at 70–71 (noting juveniles make “ill-considered actions 
and decisions” and “are less likely to take a possible punishment into consideration when 
making decisions.”). 
254. See generally Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012); Graham v. Florida, 560 
U.S. 48, 68–69 (2010); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005). 
255. See generally Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012); Graham v. Florida, 560 
U.S. 48, 68–69 (2010); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005). 
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A. Idaho’s Mandatory Juvenile Transfer Laws Violate Supreme Court 
Rulings 
The Supreme Court has considered and decided upon the sentenc-
ing of juveniles. As previously mentioned, three Supreme Court cases 
highlighted the imposition of serious sentences upon juvenile offenders, 
and restricted the gravity of the judicial decisions. Roper ruled that a 
court violates the Eighth Amendment if it imposes the death sentence 
on a minor.256 Graham then ruled that it is unconstitutional to impose a 
life sentence upon a juvenile without the opportunity for parole for non-
homicide crimes.257 Finally, and most recently, Miller held that a man-
datory life sentence without the possibility for parole violates the Eighth 
Amendment if it is imposed upon a minor.258 In each Supreme Court 
case, the majority opinion took issue with extreme penalties imposed 
upon minors.259 However, under the present Idaho transfer statute, 
there is no protection in place that avoids such penalties. In particular, 
an Appendix in Graham highlighted Idaho Code § 20-509 as a piece of 
legislation that allows for life sentences without parole for non-homicide 
juvenile offenders.260 Without saying more, the Court demonstrated that 
its ruling invalidated the current Idaho legislation, insofar as the stat-
ute allows for precisely the sentence that the Court found to violate the 
Eighth Amendment.261  
The Idaho Code is structured to provide several apparent safe-
guards in the juvenile transfer process. One such safeguard is the age 
listed in the juvenile waiver statute, Idaho Code § 20-508. There, it ex-
plicitly states that fourteen is the lowest threshold for an offender who 
is alleged to have committed any act that “would be a crime if commit-
ted by an adult.”262 However, in its current form, this age threshold is 
simply one of four ways in which a minor can be transferred into crimi-
nal court. Surprisingly, what appears to be an age requirement is in-
stead a variation on an otherwise unrestrictive statute. The statutory 
language allows the juvenile court to waive jurisdiction of a minor if he 
or she is “alleged to have committed any of the crimes enumerated in 
section 20-509, Idaho Code; or . . . alleged to have committed an act oth-
er than those enumerated in section 20-509, Idaho Code after the child 
became fourteen years of age which would be a crime if committed by an 
adult.”263 Thus, the minimum age requirement in Idaho applies only to 
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non-serious offenses, while any allegations of serious offenses proceed 
without restrictions.  
The combination of serious offenses with the absence of age re-
strictions is a modern amendment in the Idaho legislation. In fact, the 
previous legislation (under the Idaho Code § 16-1806) allowed a court to 
waive jurisdiction only if the minor was at least fourteen years of age.264 
In 1995, the Idaho legislature renumbered the statute and amended the 
requirements for transfer.265 Once effective on October 1,266 Idaho al-
lowed for the transfer of any minors, regardless of age, so long as they 
were charged with a serious offense.267  
While the Supreme Court has imposed additional restrictions upon 
the sentencing of minors within the last twenty years, Idaho has 
amended its legislation to allow fewer restrictions for these determina-
tions. The state has not incorporated the Supreme Court rulings or rea-
soning into its legislation, and continues to allow for the imposition of 
harsh sentences upon juveniles. The state of Idaho allows sentences 
without the possibility of parole.268 Idaho also allows for the infliction of 
the death penalty upon its citizens.269 Without explicit language in its 
statutes, Idaho’s present legislation allows these extreme sentences for 
minors tried in criminal court.  
Although the Idaho adult criminal court system is unlikely to con-
tradict the Supreme Court by sentencing a juvenile to life without pa-
role or the death penalty, the current Idaho legislation is bad policy in 
principle. The Supreme Court suggests in its recent rulings that a state 
ought to provide protections for its juvenile offenders. The rationale for 
this protection argument comes from the differences between juvenile 
and adult offenders. The statutes in Missouri (where Roper originated), 
Florida (where Graham originated), Arkansas, and Alabama (where 
Miller cases originated) all lacked protections for minor offenders.270 The 
respective state statutes did not proactively and explicitly sentence ju-
veniles to death or life without the possibility for parole. The statutes 
instead lacked any meaningful protective provisions.  
                                                       
264. See IDAHO CODE § 16-1806 (1994) (current version at IDAHO CODE § 20-508 
(2016)). 
265. See id.; see also IDAHO CODE § 20-508 (2016). 
266. 1995 Idaho Sess. Laws 106. 
267. IDAHO CODE § 20-509 (2016). 
268. See id. (explaining that a judge may alter a juveniles sentence, but providing no 
explicit restrictions on the sentencing otherwise).  
269. See IDAHO CODE § 19-2705 (2016) (explaining the procedural requirements 
when a person is sentenced to death). 
270. See Ioana Tchoukleva, Children Are Different: Bridging the Gap Between Rhet-
oric and Reality Post Miller v. Alabama, 4 CAL. L. REV. CIR. 92, 97 (2013). 
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Without particular language to set age limits, require hearings, or 
restrict sentences on juvenile offenders, the Idaho transfer statute is no 
different than the invalidated statutes from Missouri, Florida, Arkan-
sas, and Alabama. In the most crucial aspect, the statutes from all these 
states focused entirely on the crime committed. With a presumption 
that certain crimes were notably heinous or gruesome, the statutes re-
sulted in a threshold, beyond which an offender of any age would be pe-
nalized to the maximum extent allowed by law. The supposition is 
therefore one where a minor can be treated as an adult in procedure and 
sentencing if he or she has committed an adult crime.  
However, the Supreme Court invalidated these crime-based stat-
utes precisely because they lacked consideration of the individual of-
fender and failed to impose limitations and restrictions on the proce-
dures and sentencing. Thus, in this way, the current Idaho transfer 
statute is bad policy insofar as it does not require individual considera-
tion in every case. Although the age limitation and hearing requirement 
remain in one respect, these protections do not apply if a fourteen-year-
old commits murder or is found with marijuana within one thousand 
feet of a school.271 Although we trust the district judges in adult criminal 
court, it is bad policy to force a minor into a complicated system that 
utilizes unrestricted sentencing procedures when the juvenile court is a 
legitimate alternative. This is particularly troublesome due to its auto-
matic nature. To conform with the principles and rationale of the recent 
Supreme Court cases, Idaho ought to consider the crime, defense, char-
acter, and potential sentence in relation to the individual juvenile of-
fender and not simply to the alleged crime. The Idaho legislation ought 
to protect minors through the process by imposing restrictions on age 
and punishment.  
B. Idaho’s Legislation Ignores Scientific Information Regarding 
Juveniles 
The recent rulings by the Supreme Court do not simply condemn 
harsh sentences imposed on minors. The Court also speaks of the im-
portance in integrating objective factors into the individual analysis of 
an offender.272 According to the Court, an analysis into a juvenile of-
fender must therefore be two-fold: First, the offender should be judged 
under an objective array of factors and information, including but not 
limited to scientific tests, data, and analyses that speak to the maturity, 
understanding, cognitive development, and rehabilitation potential of 
                                                       
271. See IDAHO CODE § 20-509(a), (i) (2016). 
272. See, e.g., Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2470 (2012) (explaining the im-
portance of “objective indicia”); Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 61 (2010) (beginning an 
analysis by speaking of the objective factors); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 567 (2005) 
(explaining the role that objective indicators have played in the national consensus and thus 
the Eighth Amendment analysis).  
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the offender. Second, these objective factors ought to apply uniquely to 
the minor who is subject to judicial proceedings.273  
Idaho’s transfer statute fails to incorporate the neurological factors 
that make juveniles different than adults. By focusing only on the crime, 
the automatic transfer provision disregards the neurological deficiencies 
in minors that alter their behavior. Additionally, because the statute 
lacks the general protections for procedure and sentencing, there is 
more reason to require consideration of the psychological defenses for a 
minor.  
Specifically, Idaho’s statute is bad policy for two reasons: First, it 
treats a juvenile like an adult for the crime committed, even though sci-
entific research proves that juveniles are unlike adults. Second, it does 
not allow for a defense in which the juvenile can express this research 
as to the causes, predispositions, and consequences of the crime and its 
punishment.  
First, for all the scientific research regarding the differences in a 
juvenile brain, the Roper court narrowed the distinctions to conclude 
juveniles lack the maturity and responsibility of adults, make ill-
considered decisions, are more vulnerable to pressure, and are more eas-
ily manipulated.274 Roper and Graham determined the differences to be 
so significant that it would be wrong to equate the acts of an adult with 
the acts of a minor.275 Portraying the information this way reverses the 
foundation of the Idaho automatic transfer statute. The Supreme Court 
is using neurological and behavioral studies to show extreme biological 
differences, then deciding that crimes of a minor must be treated differ-
ently than crimes of an adult. The Idaho legislation is using action as its 
foundation, so that the same heinous crimes require the same procedure 
and sentencing potential, for minors and adults. Idaho’s position is bad 
policy because it fails to consider the research that undercuts the notion 
that ‘the crimes are the same.’ The Supreme Court, in focusing on the 
differences between underdeveloped and developed brain cognition, 
sought to express how in fact the crimes are not the same, even for an 
identical result. If a juvenile commits murder, then the biological com-
ponents of that decision and action is different than if an adult commits 
murder. The juvenile lacks an understanding of the action, cannot com-
prehend the consequences, is vulnerable to the social pressure, has a 
tendency to take risks, and could learn from the mistake. Thus, the act 
of murder by a fourteen-year-old is different than murder by a thirty-
                                                       
273. See, e.g., Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2470; Graham, 560 U.S. at 61; Roper, 543 U.S. at 
567. 
274. Roper, 543 U.S. at 569–70. 
275. Id. at 572–73; see also Graham, 560 U.S. at 68–70. 
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four-year-old. Idaho’s automatic transfer statute ignores this notion, and 
fails to integrate it into the current provision, which focuses on the like-
ness of actions and consequences.  
Second, Idaho’s statute is bad policy because it does not allow for a 
juvenile to defend his or her actions by way of these neurological differ-
ences. After the charge, there is no method through which the offender 
can introduce information of biological differences. The harshness of the 
automatic transfer is seen through this waiver of juvenile jurisdiction. 
Not only does the juvenile court not consider the individual offender, but 
there is no place for essential scientific evidence until the juvenile is in 
adult criminal court.  
Idaho’s automatic transfer statute disregards the overwhelming 
scientific research, as well as the Supreme Court cases that depend on 
these objective facts. When an individual over the age of fourteen is 
charged with a specific serious crime, that minor is automatically trans-
ferred into the adult criminal court system.276 Consequently, the alleged 
offender is subject to the same trial procedures and sentences of adult 
offenders. Although one could argue that this provides additional legal 
and due process protection otherwise lacking in the juvenile court sys-
tem, the real result is an equalization. In the Idaho system, certain of-
fenders are necessarily treated as though they were adults because of 
the charge. The possible sentences raise questions about the procedure. 
As previously mentioned, Idaho legislation has no restrictions or safe-
guards to prevent harsh sentences. Even more, the equalization of cer-
tain serious juvenile offenders with their adult counterparts contradicts 
the Supreme Court rulings. The Supreme Court in Roper, Graham, and 
Miller focused on the differences between juveniles and adults. Scientific 
research has proven the differences in brain formation, cognition, and 
behavior. To allow for the automatic treatment of a minor as an adult is 
not only unconstitutional, but illogical. The Idaho transfer statute pre-
supposes that the seriousness of a crime is indicative of the culpability 
of the offender. However, the underdeveloped brain in youth that en-
courages risky behavior and limits understanding, as well as the poten-
tial for rehabilitation and maturity, indicates precisely the opposite – 
seriousness of a crime fails to indicate the character and culpability of 
the offender, and lacks any implication into the potential for treatment 
and rehabilitation. In fact, to equate the crime with the adult criminal 
system, the Idaho automatic transfer statute supposes that the juvenile 
either acted like an adult or deserves punishment like an adult. The 
neuro-scientific research portrays a youth action as entirely different 
than an adult action, even if the consequence is the same. Additionally, 
a punishment’s potential deterrent effect is lost on a minor who general-
ly makes risky choices, does not consider future implications, and can-
not comprehend potential impacts. Therefore, not only is the Idaho au-
tomatic transfer statute unconstitutional in its contradicting the recent 
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Supreme Court cases, but also insofar as it ignores biological realities 
that make it illogical and absent of any legitimate benefit.  
C. Recommendations for Change 
To improve the treatment and handling of juveniles in the Idaho 
judicial system, I recommend that the legislation eliminate its automat-
ic transfer laws. In their place, the Idaho legislation ought to spell out 
particularized procedural rules for an initial hearing in which the juve-
nile is granted counsel, an ability to answer allegations, and an individ-
ualized process. Protective safeguards ought to be instituted regarding 
the age and competency of the minor offender. Finally, the judge for the 
initial hearing ought to have experience with juveniles and incorporate 
suggestions as to the proper treatment of the offenders.   
Holding a mandatory hearing is beneficial to the juvenile offenders 
because it provides a structure for proper due process protections. The 
hearing also enables a reflection as to the character of the offender and 
his or her individualized position. Considering the individual prior to a 
transfer embodies the reasoning of the Supreme Court insofar as it 
treats adults and juveniles differently. Juvenile offenders should not be 
subject to extreme sentences, and after the Supreme Court rulings in 
Roper, Graham, and Miller, imposition of such sentences would be un-
constitutional as a violation of the Eighth Amendment. Idaho should 
explicitly delineate these sentence limitations in its legislation. The ef-
fect would be two-fold: First, it would eliminate any temptation of judg-
es in adult criminal court to equate the crime directly with the sentence. 
Second, it would highlight the distinct treatment of young offenders and 
represent an act of structured mercy and practicality.  
The elimination of automatic transfer does not rule out any and all 
potential transfers. In fact, if Idaho finds it necessary to proceed against 
a juvenile in adult criminal court, it could still allow for this option. 
Most concerning is in the automation of the process. A cost-benefit anal-
ysis can assist in this matter—the benefits of efficiency and ease of 
transfer do not outweigh the potential cruel treatment, imposition of 
extreme sentences, neglect for neuroscience, and requirement for differ-
entiation. The automatic transfer also cannot provide a noticeably supe-
rior process than non-automatic transfer. Thus, the consequence of au-
tomatic transfer does not outweigh the detrimental effects—and espe-
cially, the potential effects—of such a policy. 
Conversely, a hearing requirement would impose a predictable and 
structured procedure for juvenile offenders. An argument can be made 
that mandatory and automatic consequences for specified crimes pro-
vide the most predictability. Broadly speaking, however, the automation 
for only several enumerated offenses produces a variation in responses. 
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Furthermore, the evidence to support each allegation is likely to vary, 
and therefore qualifies the automation on the subjective decision of the 
prosecuting attorney. Additionally, when the Supreme Court sought le-
gitimacy and predictability in the case of the death penalty, it explicitly 
barred the use of mandatory sentences according to delineated offenses. 
There, the Court demanded an individualized consideration regarding 
the character of the crime and of the offender. Arbitrariness is not 
solved with automation.  
The hearing requirement and abandonment of the automatic trans-
fer would also shift the focus of juvenile law back to rehabilitation and 
individualization. Idaho has the potential to progress beyond the histor-
ical failings and inadequacies of the juvenile court system. The origins of 
the juvenile court sought rehabilitation for young and malleable offend-
ers. Abuse in the mid-twentieth century ushered in the role of transfer. 
But this protection has since overrun the solution and its proportionali-
ty. Now, similar due process violations in the mandatory transfer re-
quire a further compromise. Elimination of the automatic transfer and 
imposition of a hearing requirement allows for this compromise—
between the offense and the offender, the past and the future, the con-
sequence and the cause, the biology and the judiciary, the punishment 
and the rehabilitation. An intentional incorporation of juvenile rights 
and protections advances justice and sensibility, while not substantially 
impeding the imposition of a penalty.  
IV. CONCLUSION 
Idaho’s automatic transfer of juvenile offenders to adult criminal 
court is bad policy, and fails to provide Constitutional due process pro-
tections for youth. Insofar as the Idaho legislation mandates an auto-
matic transfer for particular crimes, it does not follow the United States 
Supreme Court holding and rationale in Kent, which requires a proce-
dure of individualized consideration with respect to the offender and the 
crime. Furthermore, the automatic transfer disregards rehabilitative 
principles, protective safeguards, and scientific evidence that demon-
strates the differences between juvenile and adult neurology and behav-
ior. Finally, the benefits of transferring a juvenile automatically and 
without an individualized hearing do not outweigh the Constitutional, 
procedural, and philosophical costs of the procedure. 
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